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Abstract: 
Purpose: This study examines the impact of the regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-
taking behaviour of Islamic banks. The impact of the heterogeneous nature of the banking environment 
in the sampled countries is also considered. 
Methodology: A dynamic panel data analysis with system GMM estimators was used with a sample 
consisting of 120 Islamic banks from 21 countries for the period of 2000-2013.  
Findings: The results demonstrate that main regulation and supervision proxies have significant 
negative effects on risk levels of Islamic banks, which implies that further restricted regulatory and 
supervisory environment can lower risk levels of Islamic banks. In addition, the Islamic banks operating 
under the dual banking system seem to prefer to take a lower risk. Furthermore, the results identify that 
a stable political environment encourages Islamic banks to take higher risks in their operations. 
Originality: In addition to examining the common factors, the empirical analysis in this study is 
extended to the investigation of the effects of several political indicators on risk-taking behaviour of 
Islamic banks, which should be considered as an important contribution. 
Keywords: Risk-taking; Regulation; Supervision; Political and legal environment; Islamic 
banking. 
JEL Classification: E44, G2, G18, Z1 
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1. Introduction 
Well-functioning financial systems are considered as fundamental structures for economic 
growth and this relationship necessitates specific efforts to regulate and supervise the whole 
financial system, in particular banks as the key intermediaries. As part of such efforts, risky 
behaviour of banks is targeted to be limited by national authorities by developing and 
conducting sound regulatory and supervisory rules in the banking system, while a worldwide 
trend of deregulation in finance industry had been experienced prior to the recent global 
financial crisis. While such a flexible regulatory and supervisory environment increased the 
level of innovation in the industry, it has, at the same time, caused unethical and reckless 
financing practices in financial operations. Therefore, that liberal environment was blamed to 
be one of the main factors behind the crisis. Although Basel III Capital Accord had been 
finalized before the global financial crisis, the financial industry was exploiting the lax 
regulatory and supervisory environment during the deregulation period in the pre-crisis period. 
The global financial crisis, hence, has shown the importance of regulation and supervision in 
the financial industry. In responding to this, a new financial architecture has been initiated by 
national authorities, which was pioneered and coordinated under the tutelage of G20 Summits.  
Although Islamic banking has grown into an international reality by moving from the periphery 
to the financial centres with double-digit growth rates, international financial architecture has 
recognised neither the existence nor importance of this sector. Islamic banking and financial 
institutions, which emerged in the mid-1970s, have become an essential part of the global 
financial system beyond the Muslim countries. While the total assets of Islamic banking, which 
is considered to be around USD 2 trillion (The Banker, 2014), still represents a very small 
fraction of the global financial system, their performance in particular during the recent global 
financial crisis has shifted attention to this sector, which is considered to be an ethical 
alternative financing method.  
An essential distinguishing nature of Islamic banking is that their working rules and principles 
must be Shari’ah compliant or compliant with Islamic legal principles in general and financial 
rules in particular, which, among others, include prohibition of interest, and moderating 
uncertainty and speculation in financial transactions as well as prohibiting investment and 
financing in certain sectors which are considered harmful to human well-being. Hence, 
financial and sectorial screenings are constructed through the provision of Shari’ah resulting 
in specific Shari’ah compliant Islamic financing instruments or contracts. 
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Despite the strong development of Islamic banking industry, empirical studies, in general, have 
been limited on Islamic banking and finance, and in particular studies on the relationship 
between regulation and risk-taking have merely focused on conventional banking. This study, 
hence, shifts the focus on the Islamic banking sector with the aim of examining the impact of 
the regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. In 
order to consider the characteristics of the regulatory environment of the financial system in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the most recent bank regulation and supervision 
dataset of World Bank’s 2011 survey was utilised. This study also considers the impact of the 
nature of the banking system on Islamic banks’ risk-taking behaviour by classifying the 
jurisdictions from where the sample drawn as dual banking system and homogenous banking 
system jurisdiction. In the empirical analysis, a wide range of independent variables including 
political indicators were included in the estimation, which makes this study rather novel as 
such variables have not been examined for Islamic banks before.  
The sample in this empirical study consists of 120 Islamic banks from 21 countries for the 
period of 2000-2013, providing a diverse profile. By using dynamic panel data analysis with 
system GMM estimators, this paper finds that strict regulatory and supervisory environment 
discourages Islamic banks from taking a higher risk in their operations. In other words, the 
findings evidence that there is a negative relationship between restricted regulatory and 
supervisory environment and risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. Another important 
finding is related to the relationship between the political environment and risk-taking 
behaviour of Islamic banks, as the results demonstrate that a more stable political environment 
encourages Islamic banks to take more risk in their operations. As for the impact of the 
regulative environment, this study finds that Islamic banks from the dual banking jurisdictions 
prefer to take lower risks compared to the Islamic banks operating under homogenous banking 
system dominated by conventional banking. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two provides a literature review 
on regulation and risk-taking behaviour. In operationalizing the data, section three explains the 
dataset and empirical methodology conducted. Section four reports the findings on the effects 
of the regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. 
The last section provides some implications and concludes this paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
Regulatory and supervisory activities in the banking sector aim to maintain the bank’s solvency 
and to protect customers and the public ultimately. Entry restrictions, capital requirements, 
deposit insurance, provisioning rules, supervision power, independence, disclosure 
requirements and restrictions on bank activities are amongst the commonly used regulatory and 
supervisory measures. Such precautionary measures affect risk-taking behaviours of individual 
banks with the objective of achieving overall financial stability. Hence, theoretical expectation 
suggests that strict regulatory and supervisory environment in the industry should lower the 
risk appetite of banks. However, the reasoning is not straightforward. Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2010), therefore, conclude two opposing effects of regulation and supervision on risk-taking 
behaviour of banks: strict rules lead banks to hold less equity by reducing market discipline, 
and restrictions cause higher capital requirements by increasing market power. 
The existing literature indicates that the relationship between the regulatory environment in the 
banking industry and risk-taking is mixed in the empirical literature. Gonzalez (2005), for 
example, finds a negative relationship between regulatory restrictions and risk-taking 
behaviour of conventional banks by using a dataset of 251 banks from 36 countries for the 
period of 1995-1999. In investigating the relationship between bank soundness and Basel Core 
Principles, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) identify a positive relationship between information 
provision and bank’s financial strength, but other principles do not alter the banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) do not find any support for a 
relationship between effective supervision and risk. However, in examining the relationship 
between regulatory and supervision variables and bank ratings, Pasiouras et al. (2006) report 
the existence of a positive relationship between these two factors. Recently, Klomp and Haan 
(2012) have found that regulation and supervision in the conventional banking sector affect the 
risk-taking behaviour of high-risk banks only, which could not be located for low risk-banks. 
Barth et al. (2004) critically discuss several policy aspects of the regulatory and supervisory 
environment for conventional banks and their impact on risk-taking behaviours of banks. The 
first regulatory policy area considered is ‘restricting bank activities’. In practice, banks 
generally act as a financial intermediary, insurance broker or real estate investor. In 
summarizing as to why bank activities should be restricted by a regulatory authority, it is 
argued that diverse activities can lead to arising conflict of interest, moral hazard problems, 
increasing risk levels, monitoring issues, reduction in competition and efficiency. On the other 
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hand, if informational asymmetries are not significant, banks may exploit economies of scale 
and scope advantages by diversifying its operating areas, which, in return, may decrease 
riskiness of banks. Empirically investigating this relationship, Barth et al. (2004) found no 
significant relationship between restrictions on bank activities and risk proxy of non-
performing loans to total assets ratio. On the contrary, Klomp and Haan (2012) have studied 
the effects of regulatory and supervisory factors on banking risk by differentiating 200 banks 
from 21 OECD countries into high and low-risk banks; consequently, they have found that 
regulatory rules on restricting bank activities reduce banking risk for only high-risk banks. 
Regulations on ‘new bank entry restrictions’ are another facet of the regulatory and supervisory 
issue, as tighter regulations and rules on new bank entry can increase stability in the sector. On 
the other hand, restricting new bank entries can lead to monopolistic power to emerge in the 
industry, which can harm competition in the banking industry (Barth et al., 2004: 210). 
However, Barth et al. (2004) found no relationship between the restriction on new bank entry 
and bank performance and stability. Similarly, Laeven and Levine (2009) found no relationship 
between entry restrictions and bank risk level. 
The most conventional and widely used regulation method is ‘capital adequacy requirements’, 
which implies holding a certain level of capital as a buffer role against losses. As a regulatory 
tool, capital adequacy in banking affects risk-taking behaviour but the direction of the 
relationship has remained inconclusive following several empirical studies. For example, 
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) and Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) find that high (strict) capital 
requirements reduce banking risk. Contrarily, Agoraki et al. (2011) report significantly weaker 
relationship; they also found that in some cases the relationship could even be reversed for 
banks with market power.  
‘Deposit insurance scheme’ is another regulatory tool in banking. Although a higher level of 
deposit insurance discourages depositors from sudden withdrawals of their money in a possible 
crisis period and ensures financial stabilisation as a whole; theoretical expectations point out 
that deposit schemes may encourage higher risk-taking behaviours of individual banks. For 
example, Barth et al. (2004) in their multi-country study found no evidence for a positive 
relationship between higher deposit schemes and risk-taking behaviour. 
In addition to the regulatory environment mentioned above, ‘supervisory activities of 
government and independent third parties’ are also considerably important for the well-
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functioning banking industry. Theoretical expectation is that a strong official supervisory body 
can prevent excessive risk-taking behaviours of banks and ensure stability in the financial 
system (Barth et al., 2004). Furthermore, ‘private monitoring’ is an alternative tool for 
supervision where some official supervisory agencies may require banks to be audited by an 
independent third party or to be rated by rating agencies. These private supervisory bodies 
force banks to prepare detailed information about bank activities and risk-management 
procedures and disclose them (Barth et al., 2004). 
As part of the new measures in controlling risk-taking behaviour in the new financial 
architecture, under the new financial regulatory rules, namely Basel III, which have appeared 
after the recent global financial crisis, risk-taking behaviour is aimed to be reduced during 
economic expansion periods and additional capital buffers are added for the negative effect of 
economic contractions. Another distinctive feature of new regulatory rules determined after the 
financial crisis is to have a systemic and macro-prudential perspective (Tressel and Verdier, 
2014). 
As regards to the regulative issues in Islamic financial sector, in practice, there are three main 
approaches to reflect the specific characteristics of Islamic banking on the financial regulatory 
framework (Song and Oosthuizen, 2014). The first approach argues that the regulatory 
framework of Basel III is sufficient for all financial institutions, conventional and Islamic alike, 
and thus there is no need to determine a set of specific rules for Islamic banks (Meija et al., 
2014). On the contrary, the second approach suggests an entirely independent set of rules is 
required for Islamic banking because of its specific features, mainly their Shari’ah compliance. 
The third approach incorporates these two approaches and supports the view that, while the 
Basel framework is adequate in general to regulate Islamic banks, some provisions are still 
required for Islamic banks, essentially in relation to their religious characteristics. The results 
of this study would indicate as to which approach is, in reality, more pervasive and 
deterministic in the Islamic banking industry. 
It should be noted that Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), as an international standard-
setting body, provides guidance to individual Islamic banks, national regulatory and 
supervisory authorities on how Islamic financial institutions should be regulated and 
supervised. With the aim of protecting the competitiveness of Islamic banking against 
conventional banking, IFSB has to take account of existing international regulatory standards 
of Basel III. Consequentially, this implies a regulatory and supervisory environment for Islamic 
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banks is being identical to those of conventional banks, which is criticised by a number of 
contenders. These critics emphasize two important points: compliance with Shari’ah rules and 
risk-return sharing principle.  
Mejia et al. (2014) suggest that there is a need of a sound legal framework for regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banks in this development stage of the Islamic finance industry, as they 
claim that a single set of regulatory and supervisory environment, which encompasses both 
conventional and Islamic banking, should be conducted. In reflecting on the regulative 
practices in the Islamic finance sector, Song and Oosthuizen (2014) emphasize that regulatory 
practices for Islamic banking are divergent from one country to the other, because Islamic 
banking as a new alternative to conventional banking is still on its development stage. As a 
result, it can be concluded that in most of the countries, Islamic banks generally operate in the 
same regulatory and supervisory environment with conventional banks, while some countries, 
such as Malaysia, is keen to develop a distinct regulative environment for its Islamic banks and 
financial sector. 
In the literature, supervision and regulation theory for conventional banking has sound 
theoretical backgrounds, which has gained further importance among scholars and 
professionals after the recent global financial crisis. Most of the empirical studies, therefore, 
focus on the conventional banking industry dataset. However, in diverging from this 
established trend, recently, Beck et al. (2013) have compared the risk levels of Islamic and 
conventional banks and have found that Islamic banks are more conservative in risk-taking 
behaviour in comparison to conventional banks. Alam (2013) has examined the case for Islamic 
banking for the relationships between efficiency, risk-taking, regulation and supervision for 
the period of 2006-2010, who found a negative relationship between risk-taking behaviour and 
regulatory and supervisory restrictions for Islamic banks, which implies that strict regulation 
and supervision reduce risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks in terms of capital requirement 
and private monitoring.  
The existing literature, on the other hand, implies an important gap about the effects of the 
regulatory and supervisory environment on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. Most 
of the available studies have only examined conventional banks, while previous studies on the 
Islamic banking sector has been limited both in scope and in number. Reflecting on this, this 
study shifts the focus on the Islamic banking industry, which is considered as a moral and 
ethical banking method. As a result, as explained in the introduction section, this study’s main 
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motivation is to fill this gap by focusing on the impact of the regulatory and supervisory 
environment on the risk-taking appetite of individual Islamic banks. 
3. Methodology and Data 
Based on the theoretical and empirical studies discussed in the preceding section, the following 
empirical model is employed to investigate the relationship between risk-taking behaviour of 
Islamic banks and the regulatory environment: 
 (1) 
where 
 measures risk-taking behaviour of bank i in country j at year t. We included the 
first of lag of our dependent variable ( ) to construct a dynamic model, as 
suggested by Agoraki et al. (2011).  is a vector representing seven dimensions 
of regulatory and supervisory environment mentioned in the preceding section; is a vector 
of all control variables rather than the regulatory and supervisory environment;  is time fixed 
effects;  and  are error terms for bank-level and country level respectively. We also 
include year dummy variables. 
We use two measures for risk-taking behaviour of banks: (a) Z-score and (b) loan loss 
reserves/total gross loans ratio (LLR ratio). The Z-score is calculated as;  
Z = (ROA + EA)/σ(ROA)         (2) 
where ROA is the return on assets, EA is the ratio of equity to total assets and σ(ROA) is the 
estimated standard deviation of return on assets.  
Z-score is a widely used measure for estimating a bank’s default probability (Agoraki et al., 
2011) and is negatively related to the probability of default for a bank. In other words, an the 
increase in Z-score represents lower risk-taking. However, our second risk-taking measure -
LLR ratio- is positively related to the probability of default meaning that increase in LLR ratio 
represents higher risk-taking for banks. Among these two variables Z-score is more widely 
1 1 2 3 , ,ijt ijt jt ijt t i t j tbankingrisk bankingrisk regulatoryenv Xa b b b h e e-= + + + + + +
ijtbankingrisk
1-ijtbankingrisk
jtregulatoryenv
ijtX
ht
,e i t ,e j t
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used in the existing literature to measure bank risk-taking activities (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; 
Agoraki et al., 2011; Klomp and Haan, 2012; Beck et al., 2013). Although it can be argued that 
LLR ratio is a backwards-looking measure of bank-level risk-taking, we have also examined it 
as the second measure in our analysis to achieve a more robust set of results. 
In order to measure regulatory and supervisory environment in each country, we use World 
Bank’s bank regulation and supervision database of 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 surveys (Barth 
et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Cihak et al. 2012). Following Klomp and Haan (2012). With the help 
of thee databases, we construct the following 7 dimensions for the supervisory and regulatory 
environment of each country: activity restrictions, capital regulations, supervisory control, 
power of deposit-insurer, private monitoring, liquidity regulations and entry regulations (see 
Klomp and Haan, 2012, for calculation details of the indices for each dimension). 
A number of control variables were included in the estimations, which may potentially affect 
the risk-taking behaviour of individual banks, which can be categorized into two broad groups: 
country-level variables and bank-level variables. The country-level variables include 
macroeconomic conditions, which can impact the behaviour of individual firms and the 
banking industry in the end. For example, adverse macroeconomic conditions can lead 
borrowing firms to become insolvent whereby economic shocks negatively affect the banking 
industry. As suggested by Klomp and Haan (2012) and Beck et al. (2006), we include several 
macroeconomic factors that can affect risk-taking behaviour in our sample. These 
macroeconomic control variables are: economic growth rate, inflation rate, change in the 
exchange rate, external debt, short-term real interest rate, changes in foreign exchange reserves, 
government surplus, net financial flows and ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves. In 
addition, as the second sub-section of country-level variables, political environment and the 
quality of legal system related variables are also included in the estimations, as they are also 
considered affecting the behaviour of individual banks as stated by Klomp and Haan (2012). 
We also considered political economy related variables such as measures of government 
stability, corruption, law and order and bureaucracy quality at country-level for each year based 
on the International Country Risk Guide database. Lastly, to capture the effects of bank-level 
control variables, we include bank size, number of subsidiaries, ownership structures measured 
by dummy variables for government ownership, foreign ownership and ownership 
concentration.  
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We obtained Islamic bank data from BankScope database. List of all variables used in this 
study and their descriptions are displayed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: List of Variables  
Variable Description Source 
Z-score Z = (ROA + EA)/σ(ROA) BankScope 
LLR ratio Loan Loss Reserves/Total Gross Loans BankScope 
Bank Size Natural Logarithm of Total Assets BankScope 
Number of Bank's Subsidiaries Number of Bank's Subsidiaries BankScope 
Foreign Ownership Dummy variable, It is one if there is foreign ownership, zero otherwise BankScope 
Government Ownership Dummy variable, It is one if there is government ownership, zero otherwise BankScope 
Ownership Concentration Dummy variable, It is one if a shareholder owns more than 25% of the bank, zero otherwise BankScope 
Activity Restrictions Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Capital Regulations Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Supervisory Control Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Power of Deposit Insurer Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Private Monitoring Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Liquidity Regulations Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Entry Regulations Index based on World Bank's bank regulation and supervision surveys DataStream 
Current Account Balance Current account balance as percentage of GDP DataStream 
Inflation Rate Annual change in consumer price index DataStream 
Economic Growth Annual growth rate of GDP DataStream 
Exchange Rate Depreciation Annual depreciation rate of the official exchange rate DataStream 
External Debt Year-end total external debt (US dollars) DataStream 
Term of Trade Shocks Standard deviation of terms of trade shocks index DataStream 
Real Interest Rate Short term interest rate less inflation rate DataStream 
Interest Rate Differential Short term interest rate less world interest rate (Germany, United States and Japan) DataStream 
Net Financial Flows Year-end net capital outflow DataStream 
M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves Year-end M2 to foreign exchange reserves DataStream 
Government Surplus Government net revenue/spending to GDP DataStream 
Government Stability Year-end government stability index ICRG  
Corruption Year-end corruption index ICRG 
Law and Order Year-end law and order index ICRG 
Bureaucracy Quality Year-end bureaucracy quality index ICRG 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the sample consists of 120 Islamic banks from 21 countries over the 
period 2000-2013, which also includes the most recent bank regulation and supervision survey 
of 2011. We include all Islamic banks under the BankScope’s Islamic bank specification and 
having at least 2 years of consecutive financial data. The number of Islamic banks and 
observations are reported in Table 2. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of all variables 
across countries. 
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Table 2: Number of Islamic banks and observations across countries 
Country Banks Observation 
Bahrain 22 177 
Bangladesh 6 19 
Egypt 3 31 
Indonesia 10 49 
Jordan 3 31 
Kuwait 11 83 
Lebanon 3 13 
Malaysia 18 62 
Oman 2 4 
Pakistan 8 45 
Philippines 1 7 
Qatar 5 36 
Singapore 1 7 
South Africa 1 10 
Thailand 1 12 
Tunisia 1 14 
Turkey 4 25 
UAE 10 84 
UK 5 37 
Tanzania 1 3 
Yemen 4 36 
Total 120 785 
4. Analysis and the Findings 
In this section, we estimate our dynamic econometric model to investigate the relationship 
between regulatory and supervisory environment and risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. 
To estimate the model in equation 1, we use Blundell and Bond (1998)’s GMM estimators to 
deal with possible endogeneity problem between risk-taking measures and regulatory and 
supervisory indicators. Table 4 depicts empirical results for two different dependent variables: 
Model 1 represents the empirical model with Z-score as a risk measure for Islamic banks, while 
Model 2 includes loan loss reserves/total gross loans (LLR ratio) as a risk measure.  
The main hypothesis in this study that is ‘high level of banking regulation and supervision 
reduces risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks’, is developed in the preceding sections. As 
depicted in Table 4, the majority of our variables are statistically significant and supporting the 
directions of our hypotheses with expected signs. Moreover, lagged dependent variables in the 
model are also statistically significant which confirms the suitability of dynamic models for 
empirical analysis in this kind of research setting. Analysing the bank-level determinants of 
risk-taking, the results indicate that bank size and foreign ownership are statistically significant 
in both models. In other words, the results suggest that bank size and foreign ownership reduce 
the risk levels of Islamic banks. On the other hand, government ownership increases risk-taking 
levels of Islamic banks with statistically significant levels. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics (mean) across countries 
Country BA BH EY IN JO KU LB MY OM PK PH QA SI SA TH TU TK UEA UK TA YE 
Z-score 12.0 45.2 12.1 53.3 23.1 17.1 18.3 65.9 27.5 37.8 -2.7 26.5 14.5 41.8 4.6 41.5 27.8 17.3 14.8 11.9 19.6 
LLR ratio 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Bank Size 13.3 14.4 14.6 13.4 14.0 14.6 11.7 15.1 12.8 11.5 9.1 15.2 13.1 12.6 12.9 12.7 15.6 15.3 12.3 10.3 12.4 
Subsidiaries 13.2 2.3 22.8 0.4 14.5 20.4 0.2 1.5 0.0 2.1 0.0 21.2 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 11.8 18.8 5.1 0.0 1.8 
Foreign Ownership 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Government Ownership 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Ownership Concentration 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 
Activity Restrictions 2.2 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.6 1.7 2.6 1.8 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 1.2 1.5 2.0 
Capital Regulations 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 
Supervisory Control 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 
Power of Deposit Insurer 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Private Monitoring 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 
Liquidity Regulations 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Entry Regulations 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 
Current Account Balance 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Inflation Rate 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Economic Growth 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
External Debt (Billion US dollars) 33 1 34 205 15 35 26 179 4 51 60 59 1,070 88 83 20 303 104 9,508 12 6 
Term of Trade Shocks 7.3 19.5 14.5 16.6 9.2 39.8 3.7 1.6 58.6 17.0 13.1 44.4 7.0 4.4 4.9 3.2 4.8 24.9 1.6 18.1 21.0 
Real Interest Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Interest Rate Differential 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Net Financial Flows (Million US dollars) -1,818 261 -2,897 3,685 1,141 -35,605 5,389 4,581 -5,877 1,152 -2,180 0 -47,103 3,928 368 649 31,031 0 -67 2 1 
M2 to Foreign Exc. Res. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.0 
Government Surplus 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 
Government Stability 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Corruption 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 
Law and Order 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.3 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.3 
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Parallel to the discussion above, the focus of this study is regulatory and supervisory indices; 
thus, the main variables of the model presented in Table 4 relates to regulatory and supervisory 
indices. In this group of variables, the first measure is ‘activity restrictions index’, showing 
regulations on banks’ operating activities. The results in relation to Model 1 indicate that 
regulations on banks’ allowed activities are positively related to Z-score, which implies that 
restricting banks’ allowed activities decrease risk-taking levels of Islamic banks and lead to 
higher Z-scores. In other words, the results suggest that a 1% increase in activity restrictions 
index leads to 2.15 increase in Z-score of average Islamic bank in our sample. However, there 
is no statistically significant relationship between LLR ratio and activity restrictions index in 
Model 2. 
The results indicate that the second regulatory dimension investigated in this empirical analysis 
being ‘capital regulations’ decreases risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks at statistically 
significant levels (the coefficients are 5.25 and -0.14 respectively). From the perspective of 
regulatory agencies, it can be concluded that capital regulations are effective measures to 
discourage Islamic banks from taking more risks. Thus, the findings in this study on capital 
regulations are consistent with Klomp and Haan (2012) and Alam (2013). 
Despite the fact that, in theory, a significant relationship between supervisory environment and 
risk-taking behaviour can be expected, the coefficients of ‘supervisory control’ dimension of 
our analysis are not statistically different than zero in both the models. Hence, no relationship 
between the level of supervisory control activities and risk-taking behaviour of the sampled 
Islamic banks could not be found. The results are consistent with the earlier findings of Barth 
et al. (2004) and Alam (2013) for this measure. 
The coefficient of ‘power of deposit-insurer’ is not statistically significant in Model 1, but the 
coefficient of the second model is statistically significant and positive. As the results in table 4 
demonstrate, a statistically significant positive relationship is established at 1% level between 
the power of deposit-insurer and risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks in our sample. These 
results imply that a more powerful deposit insurance scheme encourages Islamic banks to take 
more risk measured by LLR ratio. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results 
 Model 1 (Z-score)  Model 2 (LLR ratio)  
 Lagged dependent variable 0.80  0.68  
  (106.35)***  (42.61)***  
Bank-Level Variables     
 Bank Size 0.74  -0.02  
  (7.16)***  -(14.98)***  
 Number of Bank's Subsidiaries -0.01  0.00  
  -(0.46)  (6.02)***  
 Foreign Ownership 0.57  -0.01  
  (1.72)*  -(3.44)***  
 Government Ownership -1.41  0.02  
  -(4.18)***  (5.54)***  
 Ownership Concentration -0.06  -0.02  
  -(0.23)  -(4.46)***  
Regulatory and Supervisory Variables     
 Activity Restrictions 2.15  -0.01  
  (8.54)***  -(1.18)  
 Capital Regulations 5.25  -0.14  
  (8.27)***  -(8.88)***  
 Supervisory Control -8.21  0.01  
  -(1.25)  (0.67)  
 Power of Deposit Insurer -0.23  0.05  
  -(0.39)  (3.73)***  
 Private Monitoring 8.08  -0.03  
  (6.24)***  -(1.60)  
 Liquidity Regulations 8.82  -0.01  
  (13.49)***  -(0.86)  
 Entry Regulations 4.51  -0.03  
  (8.76)***  -(2.54)**  
Macroeconomic Variables     
 Current Account Balance -4.28  0.06  
  -(3.31)***  (1.99)**  
 Inflation Rate 5.75  0.28  
  (2.70)***  (11.03)***  
 Economic Growth -13.73  -0.18  
  -(12.69)***  -(7.76)***  
 Exchange Rate Depreciation 2.71  -0.02  
  (2.95)***  -(1.61)  
 Term of Trade Shocks -0.12  0.00  
  -(11.06)***  (2.38)**  
 Real Interest Rate -3.63  0.01  
  -(4.87)***  (0.68)  
 Interest Rate Differential -19.29  -0.23  
  -(7.59)***  -(6.84)***  
 Net Financial Flows 0.00  0.00  
  -(3.16)***  (0.80)  
 M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves -13.24  0.09  
  -(12.84)***  (3.94)***  
 Government Surplus -1.25  0.12  
  -(0.90)  (11.91)***  
Political and Institutional Variables     
 Government Stability -4.76  0.07  
  -(6.01)***  (5.91)***  
 Corruption -3.56  0.15  
  -(5.23)***  (6.74)***  
 Law and Order 8.31  -0.11  
  (9.29)***  (5.75)***  
 Bureaucracy Quality 8.08  -0.07  
  (6.13)***  -(3.69)***  
Year Dummies Included  Included  
Constant -18.09  0.34  
  -(8.84)***  (8.93)***  
Number of Banks 120  101  
Observations 663  487  
Wald Test (p-value) 0.00  0.00  
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00  0.02  
AR(2) (p-value) 0.44  0.65  
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.95  0.94  
Notes: Wald test indicates overall goodness of fit for models. AR(1) and AR(2) are Arrelano-Bond tests for autocorrelation. Sargan test is to test 
for over-identifying restrictions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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As regards to the proxy for ‘private monitoring’ in the banking industry, it has a positive and 
significant coefficient in Model 1 referring to a positive relationship between Z-score and risk-
taking. This implies that better private monitoring in the industry decreases risk levels of Islamic 
banks. However, no relationship can be found between private monitoring and risk-taking 
behaviour of Islamic banks in the second model including the LLR ratio as a risk measure. 
Similarly, according to Model 1 results, ‘liquidity regulations’ are effective to control risk-
taking in the Islamic banking industry. This proxy has a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of 8.82 meaning that a 1% increase in liquidity regulations index increases Z-score 
of a representative Islamic bank by 8.82 points. However, no statistically significant 
relationship between liquidity regulations and LLR ratio of Islamic banks can be found. As for 
the proxy of ‘market entry regulations’, it has statistically significant coefficients in both models 
(the coefficients are 4.51 and -0.03 at 1% and 5% levels, respectively). Hence, as the results 
indicate, restrictions on new bank entry reduce risk levels of Islamic banks.  
Overall, the empirical results prove that the regulatory and supervisory environment in 21 
countries affects the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. In addition, as the findings 
evidence, strict activity restrictions, capital regulations, private monitoring, liquidity 
regulations and market entry regulations lower risk-taking levels of Islamic banks. 
Since the empirical analysis in this study is extended to the investigation of the effects of several 
political indicators on risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks, the results indicate that increased 
higher stability and lower corruption at country-level encourage Islamic banks to take more 
risk. In other words, a more stable political environment and better institutional structures 
increase risk levels of Islamic banks. Secondly, ‘law and order’ and ‘bureaucratic quality’ are 
also proven to be effective in regulating the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. 
In the sample of Islamic banks utilised in this study, most of the countries operate dual banking 
system in which Islamic banks operate under a unique set of rules different than conventional 
banks. However, some other countries locate Islamic banks within the conventional banking 
system, where Islamic banks must operate under the same set of rules with conventional banks. 
The dual banking system with more accommodating rules for Islamic banks may significantly 
and positively affect the performance and risk-taking behaviour of banks. For example, 
Mohammed et al. (2018) examine the case of Malaysian dual banking system and find that the 
degree of competition among Islamic banks is higher than conventional banks.  
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Table 5: Estimation Results with dual banking system dummy variable 
 Model 3 (Z-score)  Model 4 (LLR ratio)  
 Lagged dependent variable 0.81  0.66  
  (75.48)***  (42.61)***  
Bank-Level Variables     
 Bank Size 0.73  -0.02  
  (5.99)***  -(10.89)***  
 Number of Bank's Subsidiaries -0.01  0.00  
  -(0.70)***  (4.95)***  
 Foreign Ownership 0.52  -0.01  
  (1.48) **  -(2.11)***  
 Government Ownership -1.36  0.03  
  -(4.05)***  (5.03)***  
 Ownership Concentration -0.01  -0.02  
  -(0.05)***  -(2.31)***  
Regulatory and Supervisory Variables     
 Activity Restrictions 1.85  -0.01  
  (5.41)***  -(2.31)***  
 Capital Regulations 6.04  -0.18  
  (8.89)***  -(6.53)***  
 Supervisory Control -7.74  0.02  
  -(6.37)***  (1.55)***  
 Power of Deposit Insurer -0.28  0.05  
  -(0.35)***  (3.42)***  
 Private Monitoring 7.37  -0.01  
  (5.25)***  -(0.28)***  
 Liquidity Regulations 9.68  -0.03  
  (13.14)***  -(1.92)***  
 Entry Regulations 5.02  -0.01  
  (9.51)***  -(0.77)***  
Macroeconomic Variables     
 Current Account Balance -6.94  -0.02  
  -(5.12)***  -(0.82)***  
 Inflation Rate 5.73  0.16  
  (2.63)***  (4.19)***  
 Economic Growth -14.15  -0.20  
  -(9.56)***  -(8.51)***  
 Exchange Rate Depreciation 1.39  -0.06  
   (1.19)***  -(2.71)***  
 Term of Trade Shocks -0.14  0.00  
  -(8.31)***  (1.86)*  *  
 Real Interest Rate -4.09  0.03  
  -(5.80)***  (1.05)***  
 Interest Rate Differential -22.85  -0.36  
  -(8.10)***  -(7.57)***  
 Net Financial Flows 0.00  0.00  
  -(3.01)***  -(2.82)***  
 M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves -9.71  0.23  
  -(4.38)***  (3.43)***  
 Government Surplus 0.01  0.18  
  (0.01)***  (11.48)***  
Political and Institutional Variables     
 Government Stability -3.89  -0.01  
  -(4.84)***  -(0.99)***  
 Corruption -3.25  0.18  
  -(3.31)***  (8.10)***  
 Law and Order 7.55  0.05  
  (9.28)***  (2.80)***  
 Bureaucracy Quality 8.64  -0.11  
  (5.71)***  -(5.55)***  
Dual Banking System Dummy 1.08  -0.06  
 (1.90)***  -(8.23)***  
Year Dummies Included  Included  
Constant -23.56  0.43  
  -(9.56)***  (9.20)***  
Number of Banks 120  101  
Observations 663  487  
Wald Test (p-value) 0.00  0.00  
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00  0.03  
AR(2) (p-value) 0.46  0.71  
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.93  1.00  
Notes: Wald test indicates overall goodness of fit for models. AR(1) and AR(2) are Arrelano-Bond tests for autocorrelation. Sargan test is to test 
for over-identifying restrictions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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In responding to the distinction between the dual banking system and solo or only conventional 
banking system, World Bank’s bank regulation and supervision surveys do not measure 
favourable banking environment of a country for Islamic banks. To investigate the effect of the 
dual banking system on risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks, we estimate our models with 
an additional dummy variable, namely ‘dual banking dummy variable’, which is ‘1’ if a country 
has a developed dual banking system and ‘0’ otherwise. By adding a dual banking system 
dummy variable, we aim to control the effects of a more favourable regulatory environment for 
Islamic banks. Following Alam (2012), countries with the developed dual banking system in 
our sample include Egypt, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Turkey, and the UAE, while the remaining countries are classified operating only conventional 
banking system.  
Table 5 presents the results of the additional analysis with dual banking system dummy variable, 
which demonstrates that the additional dummy variable has statistically significant coefficients 
for both of model 3 and model 4. The positive coefficient of Z-score model and negative 
coefficient of LLR ratio model imply a negative relationship between risk-taking and the dual 
banking system. In other words, Islamic banks operating in the dual banking system prefer to 
take lower risk compared to Islamic banks operating under the conventional banking system. 
5. Conclusions 
The recent global financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of regulatory and 
supervisory bodies in the financial system. Consequently, an increasing number of academic 
researches has stemmed from the literature investigating this relationship between the 
regulations and behaviour of financial institutions, especially in terms of risk appetite. However, 
the existing literature on the relationship between regulation, supervision and risk-taking is 
mainly limited to the studies examining conventional banking industry, neglecting an important 
and growing branch of the financial services industry, namely Islamic banking. Responding to 
this gap in the literature, this study explored and examined the relationship between regulation 
and supervision levels and risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks. Benefiting from the rich 
literature on conventional banking, the regulatory and supervisory indicators at country-level 
were constructed to estimate a dynamic empirical model. Additionally, a wide range of 
independent variables was included in our econometric model to capture a broader perspective 
of political, macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants on risk-taking behaviour.  
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The most important findings of this study are that the supervisory and regulatory dimensions of 
activity restrictions, capital regulations, private monitoring, liquidity regulations and market 
entry regulations in the banking industry have deterrent effects on risk-taking behaviour of 
Islamic banks. Overall, it can be concluded that the regulation and supervision in banking 
industry is beneficial to control risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks and to strengthen the 
financial stability of Islamic banking industry as a whole.  
In practice, there are three main approaches to reflect the specific characteristics of Islamic 
banking on the financial regulatory framework (Song and Oosthuizen, 2014): The first approach 
argues that the regulatory framework of Basel III is sufficient for all financial institutions, 
conventional and Islamic alike, and thus there is no need to determine a set of specific rules for 
Islamic banks (Meija et al., 2014). On the contrary, the second approach suggests an entirely 
independent set of rules is required for Islamic banking because of its specific features, mainly 
their Shari’ah compliance. The third approach incorporates these two approaches and supports 
the view that, while the Basel framework is adequate in general to regulate Islamic banks, some 
provisions are still required for Islamic banks, essentially in relation to their religious 
characteristics. 
The empirical findings produced by this study are consistent with the findings of other studies 
examining the risk-taking behaviour of conventional banks. As regards to the three approaches 
identified earlier in the literature review section for the regulation of Islamic banks, it can be 
suggested that the first approach is validated by the empirical findings in this study, namely 
Basel III is sufficient for also Islamic financial institutions, which therefore suggest that there 
is no need to determine a set of specific rules for Islamic banks. However, the third approach, 
which suggests that the Basel framework is adequate in general to regulate Islamic banks, but 
some provisions should be made for Islamic banks, to respond to Shari’ah compliance issues, 
cannot be dismissed entirely, since this study has not examined the specific risk and regulatory 
measures of Shari’ah compliance. 
Another important finding of this study is that a more stable political environment and lower 
levels of corruption at country-level have positive effects on risk-taking behaviour of Islamic 
banks. To summarise, the results indicate that more (less) stable political environment and lower 
(higher) levels of corruption encourage (discourage) risk-taking for Islamic banks. In other 
words, a stable political environment, better transparency and a more effective application of 
regulations increase the risk appetite of the Islamic banks in the sample covered by this study.  
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In searching for the impact of the nature of the banking system on the risk-taking behaviour of 
Islamic banks, this study found that unlike the Islamic banks operating under the conventional 
banking system, Islamic banks in the dual banking system countries seem to take a lower risk. 
Given these findings, the results of this study should be of interest to market participants, 
academic researchers and regulatory and supervisory authorities alike by providing the first 
detailed empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory and supervisory framework on the risk-
taking behaviour of Islamic banks in a broader setting, controlling for both firm-specific and 
country-specific indicators at once.  
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